Image Credits: @mattpopovich (Unsplash License)

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Introduction 

For nearly every social issue that may arise in our communities, whether that be a case of mental illness, substance abuse, homelessness or robbery, the default response for Americans is to dial 911 and request the police. However, taking a step back from this social norm reveals an obvious flaw in our public safety system: how can we expect a blanket solution to adequately address the diversity and complexity of all social issues that arise in our communities? Police are unequipped with the necessary faculties to respond safely and effectively to all situations, often inappropriately leveraging tools like arrest and force, and resulting in the connection between policing and the high rates of incarceration for mentally ill and Black individuals. In the summer of 2020, public safety reform and policing were spotlit in political discourse with George Floyd’s death while the “defund the police” and community-based resources received increased support with the understanding that it would lead to a decrease in negative consequences of forceful policing. While the need for reform is evident, the feasibility of it is less explored. In other words, how feasible is it to implement community-based or social work services? Are these programs able to displace the policing footprint in public safety? There are three aspects to consider: whether community-based services can adequately replace current police services, their financial feasibility, and their administrative feasibility. 

Section 1: Replacing Current Services 

To evaluate whether community-based services can provide the same services as police, one must first understand what law enforcement training prepares officers for, what services they are expected to provide to the community, and the gap between them. A 2018 report on state and local law enforcement training academies reported that 681 academies provided an average of 833 hours of basic training instruction to its 59,511 recruits. Weapons and defensive tactics were allocated the most time during training with a total of 172 hours, dedicating the highest number of hours to firearm skills training (71 hours) and defensive tactics (61 hours). In contrast, other special topics received comparatively little attention; mental illness received 16 hours, domestic violence 15 hours, and mediation and conflict management 13 hours. This shows a clear concentration of police training on weaponry and force at the expense of “special topics” that are arguably more relevant for community needs. This allocation would make sense if police officers are frequently thrust into high-stress, violent situations. However, training belies reality, and the reality reveals that police spend very little time responding to violent crime. 

Crime analysts examined call data for 10 police agencies — including places with relatively high violent crime rates such as Baltimore and New Orleans — and found that only one percent of calls for service met the FBI’s definition of violent crime.

 In actuality, across all departments, the biggest category of time spent by police was on “responding to noncriminal calls,” taking up a third or more of total on-call time. Most notably, police spent only around four percent of their time responding to violent crime and even less (closer to 0.1 percent) on homicides. Analyzing police training alongside their actual on-call time in the community shows a manifest discrepancy. Police officers are hired, trained and equipped to be specialists in weaponry and force, yet their responsibilities are generalized to include social work, largely responding to traffic calls, low level crimes, and mental illness calls. 

Those opposed to the diminished role of law enforcement often argue that there are currently no alternatives that can be realistically implemented. However, local organizations and city governments have piloted and begun integrating community-based alternatives that have seen success. To reduce police response to traffic-related calls, the second-largest category police dedicate time to, the city of Berkeley in California created the Berkeley Department of Transportation (BerkDOT) which tasked unarmed civil servants with handling traffic enforcement and citations. A non-profit organization in Minneapolis, Minnesota created a program to provide drivers with vouchers for free light repairs instead of tickets to help break the cycle of debt incurred from petty fines and that sustains racist policing. In regards to calls concerning mental health and medical emergencies, New York City launched the Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division (B-HEARD), a pilot program that offers mental health professionals and emergency medical technicians, and found that compared with traditional responses, fewer B-HEARD clients were transported to hospitals and more people in crisis received care rather than refusing medical assistance. 

Evidently, these programs have seen empirical success and are testament to the many ways in which one can reimagine the public safety system beyond the confines of traditional policing. On the other hand, one must acknowledge the inherent mismatch between the specialized training police officers are given versus the vast responsibilities thrust upon them. In recognizing this mismatch, what benefits to the public safety system do the police offer that would not be better provided by mental health professionals, unarmed civilian responders, and social workers? There are arguments that police still need to perform investigative work regarding incidents of violent crime. Police continuing work related to violent crime and introducing community-based alternatives to diminish the role of law enforcement are not mutually exclusive. But while not entirely abolished, diminishing the role of law enforcement will not necessarily result in a loss of crucial services to the community. 

Section 2: Financial Feasibility 

A common question that arises when considering institutional changes is how the new program will be funded, and the first place to look is where funding is squandered. For example, Biden’s 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), a $1.9 trillion COVID-19 relief package, “provided $350 billion that cities, states, and counties can use to hire more police, invest in more proven strategies like community violence interruption.” However, according to analysis done by the Marshall Project, the plan to rescue Americans has largely equated to a plan to rescue the police. 

Of the $101 billion of the total allocated to local governments thus far, billions of dollars entered the criminal justice system in the first quarter of 2022. Five municipalities used funding to purchase armored vehicles, at least 38 state governments used funds for police tasers, and nine spent funds on police drones. Cities and states also spent significant funding on payroll, bonuses, and hiring incentives for police and correctional officers. 

Again, funding for community violence intervention fell short, with local governments reporting a total of $187 million spent in this category —less than 1% of the total allocated ARPA funds. Many cities have also spent remaining federal COVID-19 relief funds on police officers. For instance, most cities in California spent millions of ARPA dollars on law enforcement. Los Angeles spent almost half of its funding on the LAPD. Fresno allocated more than double of its money to police than it did to COVID-19 testing, contact tracing, small business grants, childcare vouchers, and transitional housing combined. 

In all of these cases, governments overspent on law enforcement, and underspent on community violence intervention and community-based alternatives. Yet, not only does a 60-year Washington Post analysis of spending on law enforcement and crime rates reveal that more funding in a year has not significantly correlated to less, but the police also struggle in resolving the crimes after they have occurred. FBI data from 2019 reveals that violent crimes had less than a 50% chance of being resolved while over 80% of property crimes were uncleared. For as heavily as police departments are funded, communities should have more than a coin flip of a chance of crime being solved within their neighborhoods. 

The foundational premise of police and law enforcement is that they serve to protect the safety and security of the American people, and therefore investment in police is by transitivity investment in the safety of our communities. However, empirical evidence shows that this is a false equivalence and has been co-opted to justify excessive funding despite the inability of that funding to translate into increased safety. There is therefore no reason that funding traditionally allocated to the police to purchase drones and tasers cannot be directed towards community-based alternatives. 

Section 3: Administrative Feasibility 

After the resurgence of BLM in 2020 and the lasting impact, calls for reform or even abolishment were met with claims that no other system besides police and law enforcement could effectively protect public safety. A nine-agency study of police responses to calls for service also questions whether defunding the police is a feasible solution. After analyzing millions of 911 calls from nine agencies across America, the report concluded that the amount and types of incidents for which people call are highly diverse. Many fall within categories not transferable to other organization or government sectors without substantial resource expenditures, adjustments, and commitments by other entities. Additionally, emergency call centers’ policies, practices, training, and technologies would need to be expanded to handle diverting calls elsewhere or trained to resolve more calls. To address these concerns, one should look to the innovative precedent set by cities who have already begun navigating the administrative feasibility of diminishing law enforcement. 

In 2021 in St. Louis, Missouri, the Center for Policing Equity (CPE) assessed the potential for non-police “civilian” responders, or community service officers (CSOs), to handle low-risk calls for service as well as the action items needed for their implementation. To maximize the efficacy of the CSO classification, the city was advised to prepare the 911/dispatch system to integrate alternative and specialized response systems which includes addressing dispatch staffing shortages, revising protocols to require dispatch staff to inform callers of the availability of mental health responders, and training 911/dispatch staff on the new CSO positions and the call types that can be diverted to them. Down to the very incident category, researchers also approximated the optimal utilization of CSOs complementary to current police services. According to 2019 SLMPD computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data and the diversion ratios from existing CSO call diversion programs in other jurisdictions, about 22,000 of service calls could be feasibly diverted to CSOs, saving over 22,000 hours of workload for police officers. For example, of the total calls regarding accidents in 2019 (14,256 calls), CSOs could divert 40%, saving officers 4,484 hours of work.. 

As St. Louis demonstrates, redesigning an entrenched institutional system is administratively feasible. From administrative recommendations to community education, organizations like CPE have the ability to connect city governments and police departments for the reimagination of public safety that goes beyond abstract ideals. Of course, city governments must grapple with the particulars of what such an institutional shift will look like. However, in general, cities can begin taking crucial steps to remodel their public safety system, such as conducting analysis of public safety service demand, mapping inefficiencies in police activity, targeting investments to communities overburdened by crime policing, and retraining the community on how to utilize 911. Law enforcement need not be the only solution to public safety, but to transcend beyond the status quo, cities must be open to the innovative remodeling of existing systems. 

Conclusion

While the best way to reduce the diversity and frequency of cases given to police is to invest in social infrastructure and safety nets like healthcare, education, housing, child care, universal basic income and other more structural solutions that remove the root of social issues, targeting social inequalities and structural reform is a long-term effort that does not provide immediate solutions for communities suffering under unjust policing today. The demonstrated success of community-based alternatives and its pilot programs, while currently localized and newly implemented, indicates that there are viable alternatives that can begin chipping away at the footprint of law enforcement within the public safety system. Not only can these alternatives match many services provided by the police, but there are clear pathways towards obtaining financial resources and administrative implementation. Ultimately, institutional reform and community-based alternatives can work at either end of community issues, at both its root causes and its subsequent symptoms, to achieve their resolution, leaving a minimal role for law enforcement between.