Evaluating the effectiveness of the Biden administration rejoining a legally non-binding JCPOA
The nature of political dealings with an autocratic state is a delicate maneuver at best and a nuclear cataclysm at worst, a status quo that has remained true for most of modern history and certainly true following the establishment of international institutions, norms, and nuclear weaponry. Furthermore, the capricious disposition of democratic leaders that are at the forefront of such dealings makes negotiations increasingly unpredictable, with the recent chain of exchanges between the United States and Iran serving as a case in point. With presidents preceding Obama taking a decidedly hardline stance in regard to relations with the Islamic Republic, the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in 2015 marked a historic shift in policy. It primarily addresses the issue of nuclear proliferation in Iran but also looks into Iran’s funding of non-state actors that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US government.
Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reversed some sanctions that were in place since the 1979 takeover of the American embassy by Iranian students in exchange for reducing the number of IR-1 to IR-8 zipper centrifuges that are used to enrich uranium by two-thirds and for limiting uranium enrichment to 3.67%. These processes are imperative to the production of nuclear weaponry. Because the resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII, the agreement is legally binding under international law, in accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter. It must also be noted that the text of the agreement regarding compliance with necessary measures to limit nuclear proliferation, such as allowing IAEA inspections to the fullest degree requested, was written with legally binding language, as can be seen in clause 11. This clause, which uses the operative word “decides” with regards to its opinion on consequences of non-compliance, indicates that actions specified in it must be followed. In a purely technical sense, this means that the states party to the agreement have an inalienable right to pursue investigations against Iran in the case of a possible instance of non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA. Despite the nature of the UNSC Resolution as binding under international law, there are a few important caveats to this. The resolution simply “calls on” states to endorse the annexed agreement, therefore not mandating every state party to the resolution to necessarily be legally bound to the JCPOA. The agreement is simply a political declaration, with no state – including Iran – to abide by its terms.
However, the Trump administration sought to overturn many of the provisions in the JCPOA, eventually leaving the agreement altogether. With few immediate consequences for this sharp turn from previous policy, there is certainly some merit to the argument that the withdrawal benefitted both international stability and American interests. Iran’s newly gained economic strength after the relieving of sanction aggravated interstate and intrastate conflicts in a religiously, politically, and ethnically fractured region. The snapback sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration slowed down Iranian payments to regional non-state actors, including jihadist groups like Hezbollah. This in turn reduced the intensity of wars in states like Syria, where participation by rebel groups was integral to the continuation of civil war. Allowing normal trade to continue with Iran would also allow them to be financially capable of arming the Houthi rebels in Yemen, where a civil war has claimed over 100,000 casualties. This economically drains Saudi Arabia, a critical American ally in the region that is investing heavily in propping up the opposite side in this proxy war. It is further worth noting that US trade with Saudi Arabia was valued at $37.8 billion in 2019, making their interests a domestic priority that was pushed aside during the Obama administration and the JCPOA. Another ally that was highly critical of the leniency of the agreement was Israel, a state that enjoyed closer US relations under Trump. On a different note, continuing the deal with Iran meant turning a blind eye towards the regime’s long record of domestic human rights abuses and oppression. Furthermore, the deal is not binding with respect to US domestic law. While Article VI clause 2 of the US Constitution states, “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land”, the JCPOA is not a treaty and the US is not legally bound to abide by it.
Despite the potential drawbacks of remaining a state party to the agreement, the dangers of leaving may overshadow the appeal of continuing Trump’s policy. Perhaps most importantly, the withdrawal has been one of the most important reasons for the US’s isolation from key European allies like France and Germany. These allies also make up nearly 30% of Iranian imports. Additionally, Saudi oil production has fallen greatly, reducing the incentive for remaining close trade partners and for keeping the regional power content with US policy. On a far more dangerous note, Iran is presently under no legal obligation to stop enriching uranium or building more centrifuges. Although it is currently unknown whether or not the state has the capability to do so, the long-term consequences of a potentially nuclear-armed Iran are unthinkable. In addition to this, the longer the US stays out of a multilateral agreement, the harder it will be for future administrations to broker any sort of deal with Iran. The failure to create this multilateral agreement with Iran signals that the US does not honor prior deals. While Trump’s policies had directly reduced the intensity of proxy wars overseas, violent jihadist ideology is fueled further against American interests. The rhetoric that the US does not believe in economic security for the peoples of the Middle East has a powerful effect on recruitment for jihadist groups, which costs close to nothing and has been proven to be nearly impossible to curtail. The rise of violent ideology is much harder to stifle than the direct payment to these groups.
The American ideal of democracy is also important to consider while evaluating the policy goals of the current administration. A democratized state in Iran will be easier to negotiate with and more likely to comply with international demands. Most importantly, it will be extremely unlikely to go to war with any democratic American ally, ensuring a greater level of security for Israel, the only full democracy in the Middle East. The Bush Administration is a good example to look at the consequences of a hardline policy. After years of sanctions and setting Iran on the famous “axis of evil”, Bush inadvertently contributed to the election of Ahmadinejad, a strongly anti-American popular leader in Iran. An economically impoverished Iran could also further disillusion the people from the benefits of democracy, with the state using the United States as a scapegoat for all its economic problems. Renewing sanctions will help the present regime maintain its anti-US stance with increasing popularity. Democratic resistance movements in Iran have, however, voiced support for sanctions. While the possibility that a severely weakened Iran could open the door to drastic changes, including regime change; history has taught that this would be a coin toss. However, sanctions make resources more scarce and allow the regime to hoard them, thereby withholding them from potential opposition. This can result in a larger policy problem in the long run. For example, this causes girls to get married earlier with less schooling, professionals to migrate, and an increase in black market trade. The Biden Administration has admittedly inherited a turbulent legacy to determine the appropriate course of action in Iran. The blind reversal of policies for nearly twenty years is likely to have made Iran reluctant to commit to a relationship with any US administration, given that it is unlikely to last. It is imperative for them to evaluate the importance of the relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia before deciding policy. Additionally, given the plethora of domestic crises presently facing Biden, including historic rates of unemployment, the pressing need for racial reconciliation, and the increasing COVID-19 cases, the administration will also need to assess the ability to engage directly in a foreign conflict, should the need arise as a result of continuing Trump’s policy. With trillions of dollars potentially being spent on stimulus packages, it may prove to be economically unfeasible to sustain any kind of protracted conflict with Iran. This makes the idea of appeasing the regime through ease of Trump-era sanctions increasingly necessary. Most importantly, however, is the urgency of the situation. Biden is required to make a decision at the earliest, certainly before the next six years, given the ‘sunset clause’ of the original agreement. This can allow Iran to pursue any nuclear action it wants without the threat of sanctions after the expiration of the conditions set in the JCPOA in eight years. Some potential future agreements may include a slow relieving of sanctions, perhaps by setting up loans from the International Monetary Fund or a program like the Oil-for-Food waivers set up during the period of sanctions against Saddam Hussein. This is likely to alleviate tensions between Washington and Tehran and set the conditions required for negotiating a new deal in the near future. Biden may not have many options, but he has even less time to decide what could become one of America’s most formidable threats in the region for decades to come.