The announcements by the European Union (EU) to block exports of the COVID-19 vaccines to its former member the United Kingdom shocked nations globally. This action by the European Union, which was hosting a number of vaccine production facilities, was thought by many to have compromised the global response against the COVID-19 pandemic. While the United Kingdom was considered a member of the European Union until trade discussions were completed on December 31, 2020, and it formally left the Union the same day, the January 2021 decisions from the European Commission startled those across the channel. In deciding to prohibit exports to Northern Ireland, and thus the entire Kingdom, the European Union hoped to “block illegal transportation of vaccines” and retain the vaccines for their own citizens. Compared to the speedy vaccination rate of the United Kingdom and Serbia, the European Union as a whole has fallen behind the curve. European Commission policy decisions made from June to October 2020 outlined the vaccine policy for not just the European Union, but nearly the entire continent.
The Plan:
The surprise of the European Union attempting to block vaccine exports to the United Kingdom in January, and later Italy doing the same to Australia in early March 2021, comes from the decisions created in European directives as well as their vaccine policy. By early June 2020, the European Commission, led by President Ursula von der Leyen, had developed a policy of equal vaccine access for all member states. Von der Leyen spearheaded the wishes of the European Commission by drafting documents that placed the immediate member states of the European Union above all other nations for vaccine access. That priority as described in the Commission’s 17 June “EU Strategy for COVID-19 Vaccines,” stated that “… it is essential that all 27 EU Member States have access to a vaccine as early as possible.” Additionally, this decision also included the European Economic Area, which includes both EU members as well as non-member European nations. The same communication described the actions to be taken under this policy: rapid development of vaccines, rolling review of test data, and eventual production and distribution of the vaccines. Alongside planning the necessary rapid development of the vaccine, the Commission informed the World Health Organization (WHO) that it would share vaccine data to both the organization and the public.
Economic Aspects:
Regardless of the intention to willingly share both information and, eventually, vaccines with the world, European Commission policies declared that Member States were to be prioritized over anything else. The same 17 June Strategy as well as the following 18 June Commission Decision reveals the economic impacts that befell the primary member-states of the European Union. The Member States that entered Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) with vaccine developers also took part in vaccine development and covered costs outside the funding of the European Union’s built-in Emergency Support Instrument (ESI). APAs are legally binding agreements made between a nation and producer, promising delivery in the future while the payment is made upfront. The ESI was created as an emergency fund when catastrophic events occurred so the Union would have readily available financing. This instrument shifted entirely to COVID-19 responses after the pandemic spread to Europe. Whenever this instrument failed to cover costs of development and acquisition, “[p]articipating Member States [could] decide to top up ESI funding to make up the gap to finance all packages.” Understanding the burdens for the participating Member States gave reason for the European Commission to state in October that “all Member States will have access to COVID-19 vaccines at the same time.” This 15 October announcement made the prioritization of Member States over both non-member states in the EAA as well as general nations clear. Furthermore, the document built upon the June APA announcements, revealing to both the European Parliament and Council that nearly 800 million vaccines had been purchased ahead of production from three companies: AstraZeneca, Johnson & Johnson, and Sanofi-GSK. Thanks to APAs guaranteeing vaccines, the European Commission aimed the first wave of distribution at Member States who, through the APAs, both participated in and helped finance COVID-19 vaccine trials.
Combating Misinformation:
An important aspect of the European Union vaccine policy can also be found in the acknowledgment of public suspicion of a new and unproven vaccine. Previous, unfettered conspiracies on vaccines had created a damper on citizens’ approval of any sort of vaccine, let alone a rapidly developed and administered one, which only furthered doubt. Member States also understood the responsibility of combating misinformation on COVID-19 and vaccines, as was established in the 15 October document. The recent Measles outbreak was used as an example in that document to show the importance of gaining public trust: “The lack of confidence has in the recent past led to an insufficient uptake of, for example, key childhood vaccines and consequently, new outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles, have occurred.” In an attempt to avoid such an issue again, the policy dictated that Member States must participate in active campaigns against this suspicion and misinformation, all in hopes to ensure that the acceptance of the COVID-19 vaccine was widespread.
The Reality of Misinformation:
Although the implementation of the aforementioned policies did incorporate actions against conspiracy and skepticism, they were to no avail. Despite the efforts of the entire European Union to contain and counter the misinformation campaigns created by political groups and different individuals, some believed the false claims and hampered the distribution of the vaccine.
Vaccine Production Failures
Additionally, the corporations creating the vaccines failed to reach the agreed count outlined in the APAs made by the European Commission, further creating an issue with the implementation of the policy. Instead of understanding production difficulties and the implications for the rest of the EU, local German politicians hoped to restrict vaccine distribution to the local population, especially BioNTech-Pfizer produced in Germany, until the entire population was inoculated. While providing an immediate answer to German dissenters, the move would violate the legally binding agreements made through the APAs, causing further, long-term legal problems for Germany and any other Member State attempting to restrict distribution to local populations. The thought of holding a production facility hostage until local demand was met presented another dilemma for the vaccine policy agreed upon by the European Commission.
Economic Fiascos:
With Member States receiving small numbers of vaccines and having a slow vaccination rate overall, what about the non-members participating in the EAA? They, according to the European Commission’s 15 October policy, will not receive any of the vaccines ordered until after each Member State is entirely inoculated. Additionally, EAA states, members or not, are still responsible for their domestic vaccination plans. As distribution plans phased the EAA out, the European Commission declared all APAs were “for the purposes of combatting the COVID-19 pandemic at Union level.” Along with being responsible for their local distribution plans, non-members states in the EAA were further left on their own.
Why the EU Tried to Ban Exports:
The development of the European Union’s vaccine policy at first included the entire EAA, but the plan’s ambition, and the subsequent failure to meet such an ambition, removed the EAA from future planning. The European Commission’s collective decision to purchase only enough vaccines for Member-States leaves out all other European countries. This policy decision is the primary reason why the Commission blocked vaccine exports to the United Kingdom, and more recently why Italy did the same. Other Member States, Poland in particular, threatened legal action if the number of vaccines promised in the APAs is not met due to the low number of vaccines. Recently, Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic made it known that even though the European Union acquired vaccines, her country would “be last to get vaccines from [the] EU.” Her acknowledgment of the vaccine policies of the European Union forced her to look abroad for vaccines, and in doing so, her country’s vaccination rates have soared far above those of its neighbors.These decisions made by the European Commission, and European Union as a whole, to prioritize the Member States were at first extremely reasonable. In having the larger Member States assist in trial runs of the vaccines as well as in hosting production, they would be among the first nations to receive them. Trusting the Member States to work together in order to smoothly distribute vaccines among their local populations before moving beyond Union borders also appeared to be a sound idea. However, the eventual decisions which phased out the EAA marked the end of the original ambitious plan. To focus on the European Union’s citizens meant postponing larger vaccination goals until the Union was inoculated. While not directly related to vaccine acquisition and distribution, the push against misinformation aimed to assist vaccination speeds. When the vaccine producers failed to reach the numbers agreed upon by the APAs, the European Union sought to make up for it by retaining great numbers of vaccines through prohibitions on their export. In doing so, the policy priority of inoculating the European Union’s citizens over others would still be fulfilled.