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Directly translated from Latin, stare decisis means “to stand by things decided” and is a doctrine that allows courts to adhere to precedent from rulings on similar issues in the past. According to the Supreme Court, stare decisis “promotes consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Additionally, adhering to stare decisis can increase efficiency for judges who no longer need to deliberate upon the meaning of the law for each case. Proponents of the doctrine often land in one of three categories: a belief that stare decisis promotes the rule of law, a belief that it helps the appearance of following the rule of law, or a belief that it allows Congress to course correct in the case of a legal interpretation that the court finds erroneous.
The two conditions upon which the principle of stare decisis rests upon are factual similarity to a prior case and the hierarchical position of the present deciding court relative to the precedent setting court. Specifically, for the latter condition, the precedent must have been decided by a court that is equivalent to or higher than the court in which the present case is being tried. For the former condition, the higher the level of similarity between the two cases, the higher the likelihood that a judge will weigh precedent strongly. Stare decisis also has the effect of creating a sense of security among people, especially in issues of widespread relevance to the common public. For example, maintaining the ruling of Roe v. Wade (1973) as precedent in the case of Casey v. Planned Parenthood, helped strengthen trust in the legal system and allowed couples to make informed and reliable choices, knowing that abortion would always remain an option for them. Overturning precedent brings in an element of volatility and unpredictability, because There are, however, specific instances in law where stare decisis is irrelevant, one example being secret law. Secret law requires its administrators to maintain the clandestine nature of the case being discussed, often for the purpose of national security. One such example would be cases brought under the Patriot Act of 2001. In the case of secret law, precedents cannot be published, and therefore are unreliable sources to base future rulings. Rulings made in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts – the court that grants the government requests for foreign surveillance – are treated as non-precedential.
Antitrust Law: Application of Stare Decisis
Antitrust law finds its basis in the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act and has since been treated as a common law statute. However, I argue that the Act has been made irrelevant in recent proceedings, especially because of how outdated its underlying principles are. Another critical reason behind the relative unimportance of this Act is its purposely ambiguous wording, making it difficult to keep as a prescriptive set of rules for all antitrust-related proceedings. More important to consider, however, is the reliance on economics in antitrust law. Many scholars have argued that the nature of the market is constantly evolving, making it difficult – if not impossible – to apply legal precedents from centuries ago. For example, when the most famous antitrust case of the 20th century was tried, involving the monopoly of Rockefeller’s trust, Standard Oil Co., markets were tangible and firms sold tangible goods. The Sherman Act’s guidelines of prosecuting a firm that “unreasonably restricted trade” was fairly easy to determine, because the ‘trade’ in this context is quickly identifiable. On the other hand, today’s antitrust cases are less straightforward. One recent example is the case against Apple for having a monopoly over the market itself. Where tech giants are the largest monopolistic entities in today’s markets, it is difficult to unilaterally apply older doctrines. However, this argument can be quickly dismissed, primarily because settling antitrust related cases requires a dissection of the relevant market, the firm as a defendant, and its competitors. To do this, highly specialized economic knowledge is necessary, which is not often the case for most judges. This can result in a lack of evenhandedness in the way justice is administered. By promulgating the doctrine of stare decisis in antitrust law, the extent of this unfairness can be alleviated. Specifically, all cases will be treated identically and prescribed remedies based on expert opinion from precedents.
The principles in the earlier example about preserving reproductive rights in the court can be applied to antitrust law as well. When firms are unaware of the specific type of conduct that they will be prosecuted for, it can be difficult to make decisions regarding expanding business. One pertinent case to be examined here is Continental T.V., Inc v. GTE Sylvania, Inc (1977), a case that examines the legality of non-price vertical restrictions. Non-price vertical restrictions refer to constraints applied to one party in a single supply chain. Generally, vertical integration is the merging of two firms in a single supply chain, thus not directly removing competition from the market. In this instance, the plaintiff, Continental T.V., was a retailer who sued the defendant, a manufacturer of goods that the plaintiff sells, for its policy that restricted the geographic locations in which the plaintiff would be allowed to sell. Here, the Supreme Court ruled that non-price vertical restrictions were to be individually examined on a case-by-case basis using the Rule of Reason, rather than condemned per se. The Rule of Reason is a legal doctrine used in American antitrust law to interpret the Sherman Act and determine whether conduct had unreasonably restricted trade. However, a similar case had been tried less than ten years prior to Continental, where the Court ruled that such restrictions would always be illegal. Such inconsistencies can incur significant legal fees for firms choosing to sue but end up losing despite the fact that they otherwise would have a strong case. This eventually can result in inefficient allocation of resources for firms, which in turn, is likely to pass costs on to customers.
While many areas of law focus on exacting justice from a presented truth, the precise objective of antitrust law can be less clear. Originally, antitrust law was drawn up in order to break up ‘trusts’ or large, monopolistic corporations and promote competition in markets. However, the extent of the definition of a ‘free market’ can differ depending on the judge’s perspective and political views. Specifically, the Sherman Act prohibits conduct that “unreasonably restricts trade”. The type of conduct that can justifiably fall under this category can vary. For example, John Stuart Mill felt that any interference with the market would consist of an unreasonable restriction of trade. This included government forces that intervened in order to break up monopolies as well. It is therefore difficult to universally define a “free and competitive market”, making it more reliable to follow precedent.
Given the overarching nature of antitrust law in every industry, with firms globally seeking to merge and acquire on a regular basis, it may be increasingly important to define precedent that is more closely followed. The question of ambiguous prior doctrine should be addressed through rendering it less and less relevant in today’s markets. This can be done by instating reformed guidelines embedded in case law instead of relying on a two century old document written for markets that barely resemble what we see today.